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Introduction
In recent years, in both peacebuilding practice and research about it, we have come to realise a growing interest in the 'local'.
i Such discourses have developed in a binary form though, from the demonization to the glorification of local agency. Such competing discourses reflect the portfolio of diverse local imaginaries, ranging from the notion of the Western local that needs to be saved, to the local from which the West has to be saved. 1 Such perspectives on the assumption that local actors are either inferior to international actors, or barbaric and a threat to the West.
ii And yet, perhaps there is more to local identity than this binary approach, which ends up creating an artificial neat distinction between local and international, or even Western, agency. Indeed, as this article will argue, the binary construction of discourses around peacebuilding identity risks simplifying a more complex picture of identity-formation.
Against this background, there is a need to challenge the notion of the 'local' as static and victim of what is being done onto it. Instead, the article will suggest that peacebuilding agency and the identity categories that actors create for themselves are fluid, transversal and movable, with actors constantly resituating themselves between competing forces of identification. Representing one particular manifestation of agency, peacebuilding agency refers to transformative processes aiming to improve the social conditions of everyday life.
iii This, however, does not necessarily imply that peacebuilding agency is good in nature as it refers to the subjective perspective and strategies of the respective actor. However, what this article suggests is to challenge the primordial notion of peacebuilding identity and instead look at the processes through which actors situate themselves in a particular position in society, taking into account the fluidity of identity-formation as well as the need to rethink our 'snapshot approach' in favour of an approach which allows for competing forces of identification to be deployed at the same time as well as the changing nature of processes over time. It is in this complex landscape that peacebuilding actors 1 Many thanks to Neil Cooper for pointing this out to me.
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constantly navigate and in which they make decisions in terms of which position they occupy in peacebuilding networks and connections. Against this background, this article suggests that rather than acting in a static way, actors constantly reposition themselves vis-à-vis the 'local' and 'the global'. Depending on time and context, they delocalise or (re-)localise their identities and are therefore in constant movement. These processes tend to act in parallel and reflect the complexity of identity and identification in politically contested and multi-layered processes, such as peacebuilding.
This article is based on the experiences I have personally made as a researcher conducting 'fieldwork' (a term which is problematic in itself) in different contexts, including BosniaHerzegovina and Cyprus. Starting with the assumption that there is friction or divergence between local and international approaches to peacebuilding, I was inclined to think of the peacebuilding actors I met as either international and thus top-down-oriented; or local and thus knowledgeable of local context and conditions. However, I increasingly realised that this very act of labelling actors as 'local' or 'international' brought with it its own tensions and problems in that actors de facto not only cross neat categories of local and international (in terms of where their loyalties and networks are located), but also that the labelling of one's own and other's identities can change over time, depending on the social, political, and economic context. In that sense, the attempt to label actors as local or international was in many instances not a case of neat analytical distinction, but rather a political decision in terms of which biases and authorities to ascribe to those actors, and how to read them academically.
This in turn represents the context in which I had to rethink my own categories and labels, in line with the ways in which actors represent themselves vis-à-vis policy actors or academics.
These forms of representation in turn shed light on the identity politics of peacebuilding, in terms of which identities are privileged or discouraged, and how the values attached to certain labels shape the discourses and (funding) practices of powerful peacebuilding actors.
Against this background, the article will first briefly outline the complexities of identity formation in peacebuilding contexts more generally, before specifically looking at processes of delocalisation and (re-)localisation more specifically. The article will investigate the extent to which such processes take place in parallel and illustrate how this challenges the binary of 'local versus international', which is often taken for granted, not only in the policy world, but also in academic research.
Peacebuilding and its mechanisms of identity construction
Only recently has peacebuilding been linked to issues of representation, identity and power, against the background that it refers to a set of policies which represent their agents and recipients in a particular way. as a specific historical and institutional site in the framework of which processes of identification take place, subject to change and transformation over space and time.
In relation to peacebuilding, the extent to which actors label themselves as local or international, or indeed both, is highly variable and connected to one's position as a local or international actor. Peacebuilding identity, that is, the labels actors are positioned with and position themselves with during a process of peacebuilding, is therefore highly time-and space-dependent. Processes of identification can present themselves in the form of resistance as much as of compliance, depending on the strategies that actors choose to use in their search to position themselves in the peacebuilding landscape. This ties in with Bakić-Hayden's 'nesting orientalisms' concept, pointing to the fact that compliance is not just a passive category, but reflects the agency of local actors to appropriate discourses of Balkanism to 'recycle' them for their own benefits.
xxi
The process of positioning oneself in the wider peacebuilding landscape can be considered as taking on the form of delocalisation (the deliberate attempt to avoid one's identity being framed as 'local') or (re-)localisation (the decision to frame one's identity as 'local'), or even both at the same time. This points to the situational logic of peacebuilding, which requires actors on the ground to define themselves as part of a certain peacebuilding logic, with the assumption that 'local' and 'international' identities are in a mutual frictional relationship. In fact, the political economy of peacebuilding, that is, the finances tied to certain projects, require that agencies clarify their position. Are they internal or external? In this context, the cases of Cyprus and Bosnia-Herzegovina lend themselves to further investigation, given the contested nature of identity and identification in these cases. In both of these cases, this is coupled with a political economy of financial peace-related funds coming in, and increasingly becoming scarce. As a result, the peacebuilding economy has had 7 to strongly rely on international funds, coupled with the presence of a variety of international actors. The interplay between different local and international identities in turn is illustrative of the contested nature of identification in a peacebuilding context.
Delocalisation
Theoretical and policy discourses have long implied the notion of 'backwardness' to local identity. Policy documents often connect the 'local' to critiques of a 'lack of progress', 'lack of capacities', 'problems', 'failure', and so on. For instance, according to confidential OSCE sources (international staff), the organisation pays much less for local assistants than for international staff, although these local assistants are indispensable for the day-to-day work of the organisation, not least as they speak the local language(s) and are often deeply embedded in the social networks essential for the work of the organisation. In fact, local assistants are needed as they often act as gatekeepers to information. xxxiii Such duties are essential for the 'field' presence of the OSCE, but are not considered (that is, financially rewarded) as much as the task of analysis, which tends to be ascribed to international staff. This can be read as a worry of bias of local actors on the part of the organisation, and as international staff are perceived as more neutral in terms of being outsiders to the conflict, local actors are assumed to be more likely to be biased. Their role is therefore often reduced to operational tasks, which may create new dividing lines between these two tiers of staff. Such an approach artificially tries to deny any kind of hybridity and connectedness between local, national and international actors. It equally denies the subtlety of identity, which is not always strictly local or international, but in many cases, a construction between the two.
As outlined above, such discourses are often also perpetuated at local level as well. Often, there seems to be an ambition to represent and deliver 'international' -rather than 'local' -9 skills as part of a larger international (read: Western) toolkit to facilitate conflict resolution and peacebuilding. This is particularly striking in Cyprus, where numerous individuals involved in any peace-related NGO or movement seem to have a degree from abroad, most notably from the US or the UK. Such degrees are seen as high in value, and indeed, even the practice of conflict resolution is, rather than being questioned as such, often seen as an American toolkit and thus in need of such input. xxxiv As a result, the education from outside the 'local' context of Cyprus grants the authority to talk about peace and to successfully work in this field, and, as numerous people working in the peace sector in Cyprus, particularly nongovernmental, have assured is that without their knowledge from training programmes and academic degrees abroad, they would have found it difficult to find a job in this sector. In fact, it seems to be an open secret on the island that one has to move abroad for a while if one hopes to be employed in this field. This is not least due to the widespread perception (in Cyprus, but also beyond) that local skills are inferior to international (or Western) skills, and the risk of bias outweighs the benefit of insider knowledge.
xxxv The need to 'improve' can also be seen as situated in the fact that working for international organisations can lend certain degrees of authority to local actors. An EU official working in BiH who is originally from the Republika Srpska (RS), for instance, outlined issues with being perceived as biased by fellow Bosnians, given their assumption he would support projects in RS more than those in the Federation. xxxvi For him, being part of the EU Delegation, and thus the international community as a whole, is a way of regaining some form of neutrality in terms of complementing or replacing his local identity with an international one. Indeed, the official kept stressing the procedural requirements associated with the funding application processes, which, as he stated, mainly come from Brussels and are therefore not subject to local bias. xxxvii In that sense, there seems to be a perception that being removed from local 'cooptation', or 'manipulation' lends more authority and legitimacy to peace operations as they can then claim more legitimacy in their attempts to overcome local conflict. International agency is therefore considered as less biased than local agency, thus taking the mandate of intervention and transformation for granted. Delocalising one's identity thus tends to mean an increasing degree of credibility and helps avoid accusations of being biased.
(Re-)localisation
While we can see tendencies of delocalisation as outlined above, we can equally observe processes of (re-)localisation during the course of which local identity is reinforced, often used as an economic and political resource.
Particularly in the context of the local ownership turn, there has been an increasing emphasis on the promotion of the local connection of certain projects, mainly from the perspective of international donors who imply a higher legitimacy of their projects by localising their strategies in different shapes and forms. xxxviii In that respect, the legitimacy of peacebuilding activities is directly derived from the local identity of the project, and its rootedness in local networks, almost in the understanding of 'the more local, the more legitimate'. xxxix The localisation of peacebuilding projects, which have often been internationally designed, can happen in various ways, from the consultation of local stakeholders, as is recently the case with a number of projects addressing the redesign of different public, xl to the employment of 'local' staff. In fact, from various interviews with the EU Delegation in Sarajevo, it became clear that, although they did not act much differently from their international colleagues, socalled 'local' employees would often emphasise their local connections to the country as a way of arguing that this grounds the EU's work in more local knowledge and legitimacy.
This can be seen in line with the approach of the EU Delegation in Nicosia, Cyprus, with one of their projects being entitled 'Going Local'. This programme aims to reach out to the grassroots in a variety of ways and to bring people together outside the capital city. xli Such efforts in turn are intended to promote the legitimacy of the respective institution at local level, whilst local identity serves as a gateway to peacebuilding legitimacy. Talentino, for instance, points to the importance of investigating the ways in which peacebuilding policies are perceived by the respective target societies in terms of whether they manage to respond to the interests and ideals of the people.
xlii Against this background, the EU's 'Going Local' programme in Cyprus evokes a sheen of legitimacy for their engagement as it implies a connection of the institution with its surroundings. At the same time, it has been acknowledged that this programme is only effective on the Greek Cypriot side. xliii Such an approach of course points to the contested nature of the 'local', which is never homogeneous, but complex and contested. In that sense, it is no secret that the EU's programme may not be able to cross the divide on the island, not least due to legal reasons, but is also situated in a contested Greek Cypriot community. 
Local and international: Beyond the binary
Against this background, we can assume that the notion of 'local' can be read as an ideal type at best, a type of identity which is discursively constituted in the search for peacebuilding identity and agency. Rather than a natural given, being 'local' can be a rhetorical device, or, in a more profound way, a way of positioning oneself in wider peacebuilding networks.
Identity can therefore become an economic and political resource and is inherently contested and fluid. That, however, does not mean that identity is not meaningful. Instead, the position, 
Conclusion
This article has challenged the notion that peacebuilding identity is stable and can be strictly divided into a binary representation of 'local' versus 'international'. It has suggested that identities are not primordial, but need to be read in the political, social and economic landscape of peacebuilding, which represents the canvas on which actors position themselves along multiple lines of identification. This is neither to argue that local actors are predetermined by the peacebuilding landscape, nor that they are 'unruly' or in need of intervention. In contrast, this article has suggested that processes of identity-formation reflect the agency of actors to position themselves vis-à-vis the interveners, while also acknowledging the complexity of such processes. In that sense, actors legitimately delocalise and (re-)localise in different contexts and vis-à-vis different audiences, while such processes can even happen in parallel or in chronological shift. Delocalisation supports claims to authority and neutrality, while (re-)localisation serves as a way of acting as gatekeepers and translators between international actors and the communities intervened upon. As a result, we can read the fluidity of peacebuilding identities as a challenge to the notion that peacebuilding identities are binary -that is international/local; conflictive/ peaceful; interestdriven/altruistic. In contrast, what this conceptualisation highlights is the need to acknowledge the fact that identities do not remain in neat categories, but transgress 16 boundaries. 'Local' identity is therefore not merely a victim of international intervention, but it sets its own conditions and by itself re-shapes international agency and the associated categories of meaning. The positioning in one way or another is driven by a variety of factors, and is linked to security concerns as well as political, social and ethical questions in terms of one's position in society. In this vein, this article calls for the need to investigate identity and agency as processual categories and helps understand the competing understandings and usages of the term 'local', which is semantic, political, economic, cultural, but also strategic, in nature.
